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1227 
CONSTITUTIONAL AMNESIA
1
: JUDICIAL 
VALIDATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR 
ARRESTING THE WRONG PERSON ON A 
FACIALLY VALID WARRANT  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Modern construction of the Fourth Amendment represents a sharp 
division from the individual liberties envisioned by the Framers
2
 of the 
Constitution and guaranteed in the Amendment’s language.3 The judicial 
system has legitimized the expansion of government intrusion by 
validating law enforcement errors at the expense of individual civil 
liberties.
4
 As a result, the tension between the need for effective law 
 
 
 1. Justice Stevens used this phrase to express his frustration with the Court’s view that it is 
“presumptively reasonable to rely on a defective warrant.” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 972 
(1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 2. One commentator’s study of the history surrounding the drafting of the Fourth Amendment 
reveals that the modern notion of the “right to be secure,” guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment, see 
infra note 3, is far too attenuated from that right as envisioned by the Framers. Thomas Y. Davies, 
Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 749 (1999) (“The authentic 
history shows that framing-era doctrine provided a much stronger notion of a ‘right to be secure’ in 
person and house than does modern doctrine.”). See also AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 1 (1997) (“The Fourth Amendment today is an 
embarrassment.”); Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 197, 238 [hereinafter Maclin, Central Meaning] (arguing that today’s Court treats the Fourth 
Amendment as a “second-class right” by applying a rational basis test rather than the strict scrutiny 
standard used to test other Constitutional violations). 
 3. The Fourth Amendment states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 4. See Davies, supra note 2, at 559-60 (asserting that the focus of modern search and seizure 
doctrine on “reasonableness” as a postprocedural evaluation of Fourth Amendment violations favors 
aggressive law enforcement while discounting the value of a warrant). 
 The broadened scope of law enforcement power is, in part, due to courts negating the idea that 
both arrest and search warrants are conditions precedent to arrests and searches respectively. Arguably, 
however, warrants are not, nor were they ever, “required” by the Fourth Amendment in every 
situation. See 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 5.1(b) (3d ed. 1996). Since the days of common law, courts have permitted warrantless 
arrests under certain circumstances. Id. A peace officer was authorized to make a felony arrest without 
a warrant so long as he had “reasonable grounds to believe” that a felony had been committed and that 
the person to be arrested had committed it. Id. (citations omitted). Likewise, peace officers had 
authority to make warrantless misdemeanor arrests so long as the arresting officer witnessed the 
offense being committed. Id. Professor LaFave argues that the common law’s sanctioning of a felony 
arrest, when an officer had “reasonable grounds to believe” the person to be arrested had committed a 
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enforcement and individual liberties continues to mount.
5
 
One way in which this tension manifests itself is through the Warrant 
Clause of the Fourth Amendment.
6
 Courts have historically read the 
Warrant Clause to prohibit arrests without probable cause.
7
 Law 
enforcement’s use of computerized record systems and other technological 
advancements
8
 has resulted in the ever-increasing execution of arrest 
 
 
felony, is based on the same threshold evidence required by the probable cause standard for the 
issuance of an arrest warrant. Id. Therefore, a warrant is not necessarily required. Id. A warrant then, is 
merely “preferred” in order to legitimize the administration of criminal justice by ensuring the 
protection of liberty in the eyes of the citizenry. See United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 
(1932) (“Security against unlawful searches is more likely to be attained by resort to search warrants 
[issued by a neutral and detached judicial officer] than by reliance upon the caution and sagacity of 
petty officers while acting under the excitement that attends the capture of persons accused of 
crime.”); Davies, supra note 2, at 559 (“The warrant-preference construction is favored by advocates 
of civil liberties because it enhances the potential for judicial supervision of police conduct.”); Jacob 
W. Landynski, In Search of Justice Black’s Fourth Amendment, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 462 (1976) 
(arguing in favor of the warrant because it “places the magistrate as a buffer between the police and 
the citizenry, so as to prevent the police from acting as judges in their own cause.”). In fact, the 
Supreme Court declined to “transform this judicial preference [for warrants] into a constitutional rule,” 
based on the nation’s long history of allowing warrantless arrests so long as there was probable cause. 
United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1976). 
 5. The Supreme Court, itself, articulated the “tension between the sometimes competing goals 
of . . . deterring official misconduct and removing inducements to unreasonable invasions of privacy” 
by upholding the civil liberties of criminal defendants. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 900 
(1984). See also MELVYN ZARR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE POLICE 1 (2d ed. 1980). The Framers 
intended to resolve this tension between the need for effective law enforcement and the fear of 
becoming a police state through the principles embodied in the Bill of Rights. Id. The desire to ensure 
the protection of individual liberties was a reaction to the aggressive “law and order” of 18th Century 
England, whereby the use of general warrants gave the police arbitrary power. Id. See also Davies, 
supra note 2, at 619-61; Maclin, Central Meaning, supra note 2, at 213 (stating that the Fourth 
Amendment “undoubtedly opposed [law enforcement tools such as] general warrants used in England 
and writs of assistance utilized by colonial customs officers”).  
 6. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. (“[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .”). 
 7. Berg v. County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 269 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). See also 
sources cited supra note 4 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the requirements for probable 
cause for the issuance of a valid arrest warrant, see infra note 9 and Part II.A. 
 8. In Arizona v. Evans, Justices Stevens and Ginsburg resounded stern warnings of the dangers 
that advancing computer technology imposes on citizens’ privacy. 514 U.S. 1, 18-34 (1995) (Stevens 
& Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg, quoting the Arizona Supreme Court, stated that “[i]t is 
repugnant to the principles of a free society that a person should ever be taken into police custody 
because of a computer error precipitated by government carelessness. As automation increasingly 
invades modern life, the potential for Orwellian mischief grows.” Id. at 25 (quoting State v. Evans, 866 
P.2d 869, 872 (Ariz. 1994)). Moreover, “[t]he computerized data bases of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’s National Crime Information Center (NCIC) . . . contain over twenty-three million 
records, identifying, among other things, persons and vehicles sought by law enforcement agencies 
nationwide.” Id. at 26-27 (citing Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Departments of Commerce, 
Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 102d 
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2B, 467 (1992)). Thus, any mistake in the system is magnified by the system’s 
accessibility to roughly 71,000 federal, state and local agencies. Id. at 27 (citing Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on the Dep’ts of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies of the 
House Comm. on Appropriations, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2A, 489 (1993)). See also 40 AM. JUR. 
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warrants that appear to be valid,
9
 but actually contain some latent defect.
10
 
 
 
PROOF OF FACTS 3D Government Liability § 1 (1997). 
With the advancement of technology and large computer systems, improper government 
intrusions are increasingly likely to be caused by the presence of inaccurate information in agency 
records, or by the miscommunication of information among agencies or officers . . . That the 
officers involved may have been acting in good faith does not lessen the ordeal for the person 
whose home or person has been violated.  
Id.  
 As the substantial number of constitutional tort cases demonstrates, there is no shortage of false 
arrests based on erroneous computer information. See, e.g., Evans, 514 U.S. at 4 (officer arrested 
defendant when a computer check on his license during an ordinary traffic stop incorrectly disclosed 
an outstanding arrest warrant); Ruehman v. Sheahan, 34 F.3d 525, 526 (7th Cir. 1994) (plaintiffs sued 
sheriff for false arrest when past warrants were not purged from the computer system); United States v. 
Towne, 870 F.2d 880, 882 (2d Cir. 1989) (defendant was arrested when an indictment was mistakenly 
left in the “active” computer files); Wise v. City of Philadelphia, No. CIV.A.97-2651, 1998 WL 
464918, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 31, 1998) (plaintiff was arrested pursuant to a computer printout of a 
previously satisfied bench warrant); Ott v. Maryland, 600 A.2d 111, 113 (Md. 1992) (defendant was 
arrested when a previously satisfied warrant remained in computer system); State v. Taylor, 621 A.2d 
1252, 1253 (R.I. 1993) (defendant was arrested when an invalid outstanding warrant resulted in a “hit” 
from the NCIC). 
 The Office of Technology Assessment, the now defunct arm of Congress that was responsible for 
objectively analyzing complex scientific and technological issues in the latter part of the 20th century, 
estimated that fifty percent of the arrest entries in the NCIC failed to show the disposition of the case. 
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, SPECIAL REPORT, 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 47 (1988). As much as twenty 
percent of disposition information that is in the computer system is thought to be inaccurate. Id. In 
addition, a report prepared for the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House 
Committee on the Judiciary revealed that less than half of arrests result in conviction. Id.  
 9. The Fourth Amendment has several requirements for the issuance of a valid warrant. The 
first requirement is that probable cause for the warrant must be “supported by Oath or affirmation.” 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. This requirement is met by the complaining officer’s sworn affidavit or oral 
testimony given under oath. LAFAVE, supra note 4, § 5.1(g). The arrest warrant may be challenged if 
the facts upon which the magistrate relied in making the determination of probable cause were 
knowingly or recklessly false. Id. § 5.1(g) & n.288 (citations omitted). The warrant must also be issued 
by a “neutral and detached” judicial officer, usually a magistrate, who will make the probable cause 
determination. Id. Magistrates need not be judges or even lawyers. Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 
U.S. 345, 352 (1972) (allowing municipal court clerks to issue arrest warrants for breaches of 
municipal ordinance). A third element of a valid arrest warrant is the particularity requirement. U.S. 
CONST. amend. IV. General warrants have been banned since common law: their vagueness confers 
too much discretionary authority on law enforcement officers. Davies, supra note 2, at 724. See also 
Maclin, Central Meaning, supra note 2, at 248 (“[T]he central purpose of the Fourth Amendment [is 
the] distrust of discretionary police power.”). The earliest reported state search and seizure decision 
demonstrates early recognition of the illegality of general warrants. Davies, supra note 2, at 694 n.423 
(citing Frisbie v. Butler, 1 Kirby 213 (Conn. 1785) (holding that a warrant to search entire village for a 
stolen pig is invalid)). The Supreme Court in West v. Cabell stated the rule for satisfying the 
particularity requirement of the Warrant Clause. 153 U.S. 78, 85-86 (1894). See also id. at 86 (“The 
principle of the common law, by which warrants of arrest, in cases criminal or civil, must specifically 
name or describe the person to be arrested . . . a warrant that does not do so will not justify the officer 
making the arrest.”) (emphasis added). In addition, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure state the 
particularity requirements for an arrest warrant: 
The warrant shall be signed by the magistrate and shall contain the name of the defendant or, if the 
defendant’s name is unknown, any name or description which can identify the defendant with 
reasonable certainty. It shall describe the offense charged in the complaint. It shall command that 
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Consequently, law enforcement officials often arrest the wrong person.
11
 
The story of Stephanie Johnson provides a vivid account of what can 
happen to an innocent person when law enforcement personnel execute a 
facially valid though latently defective warrant.
12
  The county sheriff’s 
department arrested Johnson, a young mother of three, just two days after 
she had given birth to her third child.
13
 The mix-up began when she 
received a letter from the county court saying that she had written several 
bad checks.
14
 Remarkably, she did not even have an active personal 
checking account.
15
 Johnson went to the courthouse in order to clear up 
this obvious mistake but, to her surprise, ended up spending several days 
in jail until law enforcement personnel figured out the error.
16
 The warrant 
for her arrest was actually based on erroneous information,
17
 which falsely 
 
 
the defendant be arrested and brought before the nearest available magistrate. 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(C)(1). 
 10. See ZARR, supra note 5, at 36-37 (explaining the difference between patent and latent defects 
in a warrant). An example of a latent defect in a warrant is one that is “apparently regular in form, but 
may have been issued by some court or official not having authority to issue warrants covering the 
conduct for which it is issued, but having authority to issue warrants for conduct similar to that 
described.” Id. at 36. A patent defect on the other hand, renders the warrant invalid on its face. For 
example, a John Doe warrant, one that does not list the name of the intended arrestee, without some 
other description sufficient to identify him, is constitutionally invalid. Powe v. City of Chicago, 664 
F.2d 639, 647 (7th Cir. 1981) (relying on West v. Cabell, 153 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1894)). Likewise, a 
warrant that states an incorrect name or alias of the intended arrestee requires a sufficiently identifying 
description of the intended to survive Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Id. 
 This Note focuses on erroneously-issued warrants that are valid in form but contain some latent 
defect. The existence of latent defects such as wrong names, incorrect addresses, or other inaccurate 
descriptions of the intended arrestee, especially those generated from erroneous information in 
computer databases, often result in cases of mistaken identity and arrests of the wrong person. For an 
in depth look at the common phenomenon of law enforcement agencies issuing facially valid but 
latently defective arrest warrants, see infra notes 11-18, 40, 105-10, 127 and accompanying text. 
 11. See Ruehman v. Sheahan, 34 F.3d 525, 527 (7th Cir. 1994) (plaintiffs in § 1983 action 
arrested pursuant to erroneous computer information indicating that their warrants were still 
outstanding); Simons v. Clemons, 752 F.2d 1053, 1055 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that facially valid 
warrant had latent defect because the underlying charges were invalid and law enforcement had failed 
to purge the warrant from the computer system); Powe v. City of Chicago, 664 F.2d at 647 (finding a 
latent defect in warrant due to lack of other identifying description of intended arrestee, where 
authorities knew the intended arrestee used several aliases, and could therefore not be certain the name 
on the warrant was correct); Murray v. City of Chicago, 634 F.2d 365, 366 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding 
that failure to purge quashed warrant from system made subsequent issuance of the warrant invalid).  
 12. Robert Tharp, Young Mother Jailed in Error: Mistaken-Identity Arrest Comes Two Days 
After She Gave Birth, THE FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Feb. 6, 1999, at 1, available at WL, 
Westnews, Ftworth-St File.  
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id.  
 16. Law enforcement personnel based Johnson’s arrest on a warrant that “matched her name, 
address, date of birth and physical description.” Id.  
 17. The warrant for Johnson’s arrest was for writing bad checks. Id. Although the checks had her 
name and address printed on them, the driver’s license number that appeared on the checks did not 
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fingered her as a criminal.
18
  
Stephanie Johnson’s story depicts a growing problem in the area of 
constitutional law and criminal procedure, namely, whether a facially 
valid, though erroneously-issued warrant, can supply probable cause for 
the subsequent arrest of the wrong person. The resolution of this issue 
directly affects an individual’s ability to seek redress19 from the 
government for a Fourth Amendment violation.
20
 The debate as to whether 
such warrants can constitute probable cause is important because over the 
last several decades, courts have increasingly limited the scope of the 
Fourth Amendment’s protections.21 This determination of probable cause, 
 
 
belong to her. Id.  
 18. Johnson remained in jail for two days before the police determined that her fingerprints did 
not match those of the person sought in the warrant. Id. 
 19. The Supreme Court first recognized the ability of an individual to sue the government for 
constitutional violations in Monroe v. Pape. 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961). See Michael Wells & Thomas 
A. Eaton, Substantive Due Process and the Scope of Constitutional Torts, 18 GA. L. REV. 201, 211 
(1984) (“The cardinal principle of constitutional tort . . . is that an injured person can sue in federal 
court under section 1983 even if state law provides a remedy for the government conduct of which he 
complains.”) (citation omitted). Therefore, a claim against the federal government for a deprivation of 
liberty (unlawful “seizure”) for violating the Fourth Amendment should not be precluded simply 
because there is a common law or state tort law for false imprisonment.  
 Congress provided a civil cause of action for the deprivation of a federal right under the “color of 
law” in 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which states in pertinent part: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State 
or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the 
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured 
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). 
 However, the Supreme Court has noted that “section [1983] is not itself a source of substantive 
rights, but a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United 
States Constitution and federal statutes that it describes.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 
(1979) (emphasis added). 
 20. Cases of mistaken identity resulting in the arrest of the wrong person constitute “seizures” of 
a person under the Fourth Amendment and should not be brought as a deprivation of liberty under the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) 
(“Because the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection 
against this sort of physically intrusive governmental conduct [excessive force in arrest, investigatory 
“Terry” stops or other seizures], that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due 
process,’ must be the guide for analyzing these claims.”); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 428-
29 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment speaks equally to both searches and 
seizures, and since an arrest . . . is quintessentially a seizure. . . . [L]ogic therefore would seem to 
dictate that arrests be subject to the warrant requirement [of the Fourth Amendment] at least to the 
same extent as searches.”) (citations omitted); LAFAVE, supra note 4, § 5.1(a) (“It must be recognized 
that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 
‘seized’ that person.”). 
 21. Modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence regards “the needs and interests of law 
enforcement [as] paramount despite the use of suspicionless and oppressive intrusions to further these 
interests.” Tracey Maclin, Justice Thurgood Marshall: Taking the Fourth Amendment Seriously, 77 
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in turn, may adversely impact an individual’s ability to seek redress from 
the government for such impositions.
22
  Where a court upholds the 
existence of probable cause in spite of the arrest warrant erroneously 
issued in the wrong person’s name, the individual subsequently arrested 
because of that warrant has no cause of action for civil damages against 
the government.
23
 Therefore, a judicial finding that there was no probable 
 
 
CORNELL L. REV. 723, 741, 776 (1992) (examining the erosion of Fourth Amendment protection 
during Justice Thurgood Marshall’s term on the Supreme Court, lauding his strong dissenting voice, 
which warned of the “evisceration of Fourth Amendment rights”). 
 22. See infra notes 23-24 and accompanying text. Additionally, the existence and application of 
various types of immunity have negatively impacted an individual’s right to sue the government and 
law enforcement officials for wrongful arrest and false imprisonment. John R. Williams, Representing 
Plaintiffs in Civil Rights Litigation Under Section 1983, 619 P.L.I. LITIG. 127, 391 (1999) (citing 
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (“Qualified immunity is, obviously, an almost irrationally 
pro-defendant doctrine, designed, as the Supreme Court says, to protect ‘all but the plainly 
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’”)). Federal and state governments, consenting to 
be sued through statutory tort provisions, have altered the common law theory of sovereign immunity 
by which a government is free from all liability. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 753 (7th ed. 1999). 
However, where the government has not passed legislation consenting to be sued, official immunity 
exists. This doctrine seeks to reconcile the following concerns:  
[T]he protection of the individual citizen against pecuniary damage caused by oppressive or 
malicious actions on the part of the officials of the Federal Government . . . [and] the protection of 
the public interest by shielding responsible governmental officers against the harassment and 
inevitable hazards of vindictive of ill-founded damage suits brought on account of action taken in 
the exercise of their official responsibilities. 
Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 565 (1959). Liability of a local government for monetary, declaratory, or 
injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is appropriate where the alleged unconstitutional action 
“implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and 
promulgated by that body’s officers.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690 
(1978).  
 However, qualified immunity, which immunizes duties that are of a discretionary nature, is a 
defense to liability under § 1983. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Another source of 
governmental immunity is the Eleventh Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of 
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or 
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of 
any Foreign State.”). Lawsuits brought against state officials “in their official capacities” are 
considered suits against the state itself, which are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Will v. Mich. 
Dep’t. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989). However, “States can, and often do, waive their 
Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Williams, supra, at 419. 
 23. A finding of probable cause necessarily implies that no Fourth Amendment violation has 
occurred with respect to the Warrant Clause. Notwithstanding the evaluation of the validity of 
probable cause, courts have been willing to accept an officer’s good-faith reliance on the validity of 
the warrant at the time of execution as a bar to recovery. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (“Reliance on the 
objective reasonableness of an official’s conduct . . . should avoid excessive disruption of government 
and permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment.”); Joye v. Richland 
County, 47 F. Supp. 2d 663, 669-70 (D.S.C. 1999) (granting summary judgment to defendants because 
executing a warrant that had been issued by mistake, unbeknownst to the arresting officer, “‘is not the 
stuff out of which a proper federal case is made’”) (quoting Johnson v. Miller, 680 F.2d 39, 42 (7th 
Cir. 1982))); Wise v. City of Philadelphia, No. CIV.A.97-2651, 1998 WL 464918, at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 
31, 1998) (granting summary judgment for defendants when officers relied on a previously satisfied 
bench warrant); St. Fort v. Grinnell, No. 95-C-2295, 1995 WL 632274, at *2-5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 
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cause based on a warrant issued in the wrong name permits the wrongfully 
arrested individual to seek redress from the government for a violation of 
his constitutional liberties.
24
 Courts are split on the issue of whether a 
facially valid though latently defective warrant can supply probable cause 
for the person erroneously named in the warrant.
25
  
This Note proposes a resolution to this perplexing area of constitutional 
criminal procedure: one that will restore dignity to individual rights in an 
attempt to regain the true meaning of the Fourth Amendment and curtail 
the “Orwellian Mischief”26 of police invasiveness. Part II of this Note 
outlines the development of the law of arrest warrants and the Fourth 
Amendment.
27
 Part III analyzes the current conflict among federal courts 
regarding this probable cause determination. Part IV proposes to resolve 
the confusion in favor of the individual and discusses the impact of this 
proposal on the individual’s ability to seek redress from the government. 
 
 
1995) (dismissing plaintiff’s § 1983 claim when Sheriff relied on a facially valid warrant). See also 
Anderson M. Renick, Orwellian Mischief—Extending the Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary 
Rule: Arizona v. Evans, 25 CAP. U. L. REV. 705, 728 (1996) (“The Evans majority’s new ‘good-faith’ 
exception to the exclusionary rule allows an invalid or nonexistent computerized warrant to substitute 
for both probable cause to arrest and a search warrant . . . disregard[ing] the Court’s prior holding in 
Whitley that an arrest made without probable cause does not justify a search when the officer is acting 
on inaccurate information supplied by other members of law enforcement.”). 
 24. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 418 
(Frank J. Remington ed., 1965) (“If conviction is conclusive evidence of probable cause, and if 
probable cause subsequently found is an absolute defense to suit . . . it may be that a finding of 
probable cause at the preliminary examination will also serve as a bar.”). 
 25. Berg v. Country of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 271 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that improperly 
issued warrant cannot constitute probable cause for an arrest). See also Johnson v. Miller, 680 F.2d 39, 
41 (7th Cir. 1982) (resolving plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against police officers for wrongful arrest on 
different grounds due to of fear of the “casuistic route of deeming a warrant to be valid on its face even 
if it contains discrepancies . . . and then invoking the proposition that the execution of a valid warrant 
against the person named in it does not violate the Fourth Amendment even if the warrant was issued 
by mistake.”). But see United States v. Towne, 870 F.2d at 880, 884-85 (2d Cir. 1989) (upholding 
arrest based on a warrant later established to have been erroneously issued). 
 26. Justice Ginsburg adopted this phrase from the Arizona Supreme Court in her dissenting 
opinion in Arizona v. Evans. 514 U.S. 1, 25 (1995). 
 27. This Note primarily analyzes federal law. However, the issue of requisite probable cause for 
an erroneously-issued arrest warrant arises in state courts as well. See, e.g., Ott v. Maryland, 600 A.2d 
111 (Md. 1992); State v. Taylor, 621 A.2d 1252 (R.I. 1993). But see Berg, 219 F.3d at 268-69 (citing 
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842-43 (1998) (“[T]he constitutionality of arrests by 
state officials is governed by Fourth Amendment rather than due process analysis.”)). Frequently these 
cases are either brought under state tort law or both state and federal constitutional law but are not 
removed to federal court. This Note will refer to state cases insofar as they are part of federal case law 
analyses. See, e.g., infra note 117, 120. 
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II. HISTORY 
A. An Overview of the Warrant Requirement and Probable Cause 
The Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment states, “[N]o Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized.”28 
Probable cause, aside from being the “glory of American legal 
history,”29 is indispensable to the issuance of a valid warrant under the 
Fourth Amendment.
30
 It is the “constitutional sine qua non [of] the search 
warrant and the arrest warrant alike.”31 The Supreme Court most cogently 
explained probable cause in Brinegar v. United States.
32
 Noting the 
troubling line between mere suspicion and probable cause, the Court 
stated: 
 In dealing with probable cause . . . as the very name implies, we 
deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual 
and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable 
and prudent men, not legal technicians, act . . . .  
 Probable cause has come to mean more than bare suspicion: 
Probable cause exists where “the facts and circumstances within 
their (the officers’) knowledge and of which they had reasonably 
trustworthy information (are) sufficient in themselves to warrant a 
man of reasonable caution in the belief that” an offense has been or 
is being committed . . . .  
 These long-prevailing standards seek to safeguard citizens from 
rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and from 
unfounded charges of crime.
33
 
 
 
 28. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. For a discussion of the particularity requirement of the Warrant 
Clause of the Fourth Amendment, see supra note 9. 
 29. Jack K. Weber, The Birth of Probable Cause, 11 ANGLO-AM L. REV. 155, 166 (1982). 
 30. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See also WILLIAM W. GREENHALGH, THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT HANDBOOK: A CHRONOLOGICAL SURVEY OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 10 (1995).  
 31. Id. 
 32. 338 U.S. 160 (1949), reh’g denied, 338 U.S. 839 (1949). As of February 23, 2002, Westlaw 
listed more than 4000 references citing to Brinegar. http://www.westlaw.com. See also 
http://www.lexis.com (citing Brinegar approximately 3900 times). Brinegar v. United States is 
“generally accepted as the best definition of probable cause.” GREENHALGH, supra note 30, at 10. 
 33. Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175-76 (citations and footnote omitted). See also Illinois v. Gates, 462 
U.S. 213, 232 (1983) (“[P]robable cause is a fluid concept[,] turning on the assessment of probabilities 
in particular factual contexts . . . .”). 
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In addition, a magistrate makes the probable cause determination.
34
 An 
arrest warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate’s informed and 
deliberate determination is “preferred over the hurried action of officers 
and others who may happen to make arrests.”35  
B. Facial Validity of Arrest Warrants and Probable Cause: The Supreme 
Court Speaks Out 
The arrest of an individual without a valid arrest warrant and absent 
any justifiable circumstances for which probable cause may be based
36
 is a 
classic Fourth Amendment violation.
37
 False arrests and detentions 
without valid warrants or probable cause are exactly the dangers that the 
Framers sought to cure through the Warrant Clause of the Fourth 
Amendment.
38
 A different question arises, however, when a law 
 
 
 34. See supra note 9 and accompanying test. See also Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 120 (1975) 
(noting that a finding of probable cause traditionally made by magistrate in a nonadversarial 
proceeding). But see Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 347-54 (1972) (upholding probable 
cause determination by nonmagistrates). 
 35. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932). See also CLARENCE ALEXANDER, THE 
LAW OF ARREST IN CRIMINAL AND OTHER PROCEEDINGS 374 (vol. I 1949) (citing United States v. 
Harnick, 289 F. 256, 259 (D. Conn. 1922) (explaining that probable cause is a mixed question of law 
and fact, a finding of which is a “magisterial and jurisdictional act, which cannot be delegated to the 
accuser.”)). But see LAFAVE, supra note 4, § 5.1(b) (questioning the proposition that “before-the-fact 
judicial authorization necessarily affords greater protection of Fourth Amendment rights” when it 
often seems that magistrates simply “rubber-stamp” arrest warrants). 
 36. For a discussion of justifiable circumstances of an arrest without a warrant, see supra note 4. 
 37. Brown v. Byer, 870 F.2d 975, 978 (5th Cir. 1989) (finding that altering a warrant supported 
the inference that the arresting officer knew the person he intended to arrest was not the individual 
described in the warrant). 
 38. Professor Davies argues that the Fourth Amendment was originally meant to be a ban on 
“too-loose warrants . . . reaffirm[ing] the common law’s general resistance to conferring discretionary 
authority on ordinary officers.” Davies, supra note 2, at 724. The historical record demonstrates that 
the Framers borrowed much of the Fourth Amendment’s language from earlier state texts regarding 
searches and seizures. Id. at 669. For example, a provision adopted by Massachusetts in 1780 stated: 
Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and seizures of his person, 
his house, his papers, and all his possessions. All warrants, therefore, are contrary to this right, if 
the cause or foundation of them be not previously supported by oath or affirmation; and if the 
order in the warrant to a civil officer, to make search in suspected places, or to arrest one or more 
suspected persons, or to seize their property, be not accompanied with a special designation of the 
person or objects of search, arrest, or seizure: And no warrant ought to be issued, but in cases, and 
with the formalities, prescribed by the laws. 
Davies, supra note 2, at 684 & n.379 (citing MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. XIV, reprinted in THE 
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 234 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 
1997) (emphasis added)).  
 Professor Davies speculates that James Madison, a major drafter of the Fourth Amendment, may 
have borrowed the concept of probable cause, which had not been used in any state constitutional 
provisions, from a 1786 Pennsylvania customs statute requiring a “sworn-to showing of ‘probable 
cause’ as a condition for granting a search warrant for a house to a national customs collector.” Id. at 
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enforcement agent arrests an incorrect person on the basis of a facially 
valid warrant.
39
 False arrests have long been a part of this country’s law 
enforcement history.
40
 As early as West v. Cabell,
41
 courts have 
entertained civil actions
42
 by plaintiffs attempting to seek redress from the 
government and law enforcement officials for allegedly unlawful arrests 
and imprisonments. In West, police arrested and imprisoned the plaintiff, 
V.M. West, based on a warrant issued for a person named James West.
43
 
Consequently, V.M. West brought a civil action against the deputy 
marshal responsible for his arrest and imprisonment.
44
 The lower court 
 
 
703 & n.444. But see Maclin, Central Meaning, supra note 2, at 213 (advocating adherence to the 
underlying vision of the Fourth Amendment, the prevention of unchecked police discretion, rather than 
preoccupation “with permissible law enforcement practices of the eighteenth century,” in construing 
the Fourth Amendment for a modern society). 
 39. A false arrest can manifest itself in two ways: First, the arresting agent may misidentify the 
person sought in the warrant, resulting in a common case of mistaken identity. Second, a warrant that 
appears valid on its face, but was the product of a law enforcement personnel error issuing the warrant 
in the wrong name, when executed, will result in the wrongful arrest of an innocent person. For a 
discussion of the facial validity of warrants and technical defects, see supra note 9 and accompanying 
text. 
 40. One legal historian has noted that false arrests are a major problem carried over from our 
British roots, since the time of Edward I. See Weber, supra note 29, at 155. Such cases of false arrests 
based on mistaken identity are still prevalent today. Local newspapers have documented numerous 
accounts of people all over the country who have been falsely arrested and imprisoned due to such law 
enforcement errors. In one recent case, local law enforcement, in the course of investigating a battery 
and criminal damage to property, requested a warrant for the suspect whom they identified by name. 
See Kevin Simpson, Police Arrest Wrong Man with Right Name, THE PANTAGRAPH BLOOMINGTON 
(Ill.), Mar. 25, 2000, at A4, available at 2000 WL 7788910. The law enforcement agents took the 
information listed on the warrant from the county’s computerized database. Id. The person arrested 
pursuant to that warrant had the misfortune of having the same name as the real suspect of the police 
investigation. Id. The wrong man was held overnight in jail before the police discovered the mistake. 
Id. 
 Another man grew tired of police constantly mistaking him for his fugitive brother (even though 
they are fraternal twins and do not look alike) and moved into the woods after his last incarceration to 
become a mountain man and live off the land. See Troy Anderson, Case of Mistaken Identity; Twin 
Jailed on Brother’s Warrent [sic], L.A. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 30, 1999, at N1, available at 1999 WL 
7040099. 
 41. 153 U.S. 78 (1894). 
 42. This Note examines both civil cases for damages for false arrest and imprisonment as well as 
criminal appeals by defendants seeking to overturn their convictions. In the context of Fourth 
Amendment analysis and for the purpose of this Note, the difference between a civil and a criminal 
case is inconsequential. The constitutional question in a civil case brought under § 1983 for false arrest 
is the same as in a criminal case raising a Fourth Amendment violation. “‘The first inquiry in any 
§ 1983 suit’ is ‘to isolate the precise constitutional violation with which [the defendant] is charged.’” 
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989) (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 
(1979)). “In most instances, that will be either the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against 
unreasonable seizures of the person, or the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual 
punishments, which are the two primary sources of constitutional protection against physically abusive 
governmental conduct.” Id. at 394. 
 43. 153 U.S. at 78-80. 
 44. Id. This action was maintained upon a marshal’s bond, under a statute authorizing an injured 
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refused to give West’s requested jury instruction, which stated that the 
warrant for James West could not authorize the arrest of V.M. West, even 
if V.M. West was the intended party.
45
 On appeal, the Supreme Court 
reversed and remanded the case for a new trial due to the apparent defect 
in the warrant.
46
 The Court reasoned that under common law, which the 
authors of the Fourth Amendment subsequently incorporated into the 
Warrant Clause, if the warrant does not accurately name the intended 
arrestee or describe him sufficiently to identify him, then the arresting 
officer is liable for false imprisonment.
47
 
Nearly a century later, the Court articulated that an arrest based on a 
warrant, subsequently found to be lacking probable cause, violated an 
individual’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.48 In Whiteley v. 
Warden,
49
 the police arrested Harold Whiteley pursuant to a state-wide 
police bulletin that described him and stated that a magistrate had issued a 
warrant for his arrest.
50
 At his state trial for breaking and entering, 
Whiteley moved to suppress evidence that the police had seized as fruits 
of the search incident to his arrest.
51
 The trial judge overruled the motion 
to suppress the evidence and sentenced Whitely based on a finding of 
guilt.
52
 The district court denied Whiteley’s petition for habeas corpus, the 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari.
53
 The Supreme Court, finding that the issuance of the 
arrest warrant based on the sheriff’s complaint lacked probable cause,54 
 
 
party to sue for a breach of a deputy’s duties to “faithfully perform all the duties of his office.” Id. at 
84-85.  
 45. Id. at 81. 
 46. Id. at 88. The defendant argued that the warrant met the particularity requirement of the 
Fourth Amendment because although the warrant stated the name of James West, the incorrect name, 
the defendant subjectively intended to arrest V.M. West, due to his belief that people in that part of the 
country “were known by other than their correct names.” Id. at 81. 
 47. Id. at 85. Many actions for false imprisonment, however, have, over time, been heavily 
limited by the various immunity doctrines. See generally Williams, supra note 22, at 388-421 
(discussing the effects of immunity in § 1983 actions). 
 48. Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971). 
 49. Id.  
 50. Id. at 563-64. Whiteley’s arrest, based on information obtained by the arresting officer from 
the police bulletin, was warrantless. Id. A warrantless arrest is clearly distinguishable from a situation 
in which an officer is physically in possession of a warrant. Arguably, it is more objectively reasonable 
for an arresting officer to rely on probable cause when he is in possession of an arrest warrant. The 
significance of this difference will be addressed in the analysis section of this Note. See infra Part 
III.B. 
 51. 401 U.S. at 561. 
 52. Id. at 561 & n.1. 
 53. Id. at 561-62. 
 54. Id. at 565. The complaint merely stated the sheriff’s conclusions about the identity of the 
perpertrator; it failed to state that the information was based on an informant’s tip. Id. Furthermore, the 
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held that the trial court erred in denying Whiteley’s motion to suppress the 
evidence.
55
  The Court reasoned that even though the arresting officers 
were entitled to assume that a valid warrant based on probable cause 
existed, “[w]here, however, the contrary turns out to be true, an otherwise 
illegal arrest cannot be insulated from challenge.”56 
Just one month later, in an analogous context,
57
 the Supreme Court 
ruled against an individual’s allegation that the police violated his Fourth 
Amendment rights when they mistook him for the person actually listed in 
the warrant.
58
 In Hill v. California,
59
 the police arrested a man named 
Miller at Hill’s apartment, believing him to be Hill, despite his protests 
that he was not the man whom they sought and ignoring the identification 
that he produced to confirm that fact.
60
 The police conducted a search 
incident to that arrest,
61
 the fruits of which were subsequently used to 
convict Hill of robbery.
62
 The Court, stating its agreement with the 
Supreme Court of California, affirmed Hill’s conviction.63 The Court held 
that when the police have probable cause to arrest one person, the 
subsequent arrest of the wrong person based on a reasonable mistake
64
 is 
constitutionally valid.
65
 The Court reasoned that “sufficient probability, 
 
 
complaint lacked corroborating evidence. Id. As such, the Court found that the complaint failed to 
meet the requirement that the information submitted for a finding of probable cause for the issuance of 
an arrest warrant must be sufficient to support the independent judgment of a disinterested magistrate. 
Id. at 564-65 (citing Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969)). 
 55. 401 U.S. at 569. As a result of this prejudicial error, the Court remanded the case with 
instructions to dispose of the case unless the State made arrangements to retry Whiteley. Id.  
 56. Id. at 568. 
 57. This Note draws analogies between cases involving reasonable reliance on the existence of 
probable cause for a warrantless arrest and cases in which law enforcement or the courts subsequently 
deem a facially valid arrest warrant defective, thereby calling into question the existence of probable 
cause. In either scenario or variation of any such fact pattern, the result is ultimately the same: the 
police have arrested the wrong person. 
 58. Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 802-05 (1971). Archie William Hill, Jr. conceded that the 
warrant was valid and based upon probable cause. Id. at 799. This concession is significant because it 
shifts the Court’s analysis away from a valid arrest based on probable cause to a postarrest 
reasonableness analysis. For a more thorough discussion, see Part III. 
 59. 401 U.S. 797 (1971). 
 60. Id. at 799. 
 61. The police did not have an arrest or search warrant for Hill or his apartment. Id. at 799.  
 62. Id. at 801. 
 63. Id. at 802. 
 64. For a discussion of the difference between preissuance of arrest warrant determination of 
probable cause and the postarrest reasonableness analysis, see infra note 92 and Part III.B. 
 65. Hill, 401 U.S. at 802 (quoting California v. Hill, 446 P.2d 521, 523 (1968)). The Court held 
that there is no Fourth Amendment violation if the arrest is based on probable cause, even when an 
officer mistakenly arrests the wrong person. Id. at 803-04. The Court simply assumed that probable 
cause existed for the arrest. Id. The assumption that probable cause exists for an individual whom the 
police never intended to arrest is counterintuitive and defies logical justification. In the same vein, 
(albeit in the context of the application of the exclusionary rule to search warrants), deference to a 
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not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth 
Amendment.”66  
Likewise, the Supreme Court in Baker v. McCollan
67
 upheld the 
dismissal of an individual’s claim of false arrest and imprisonment based 
on mistaken identity in a § 1983 action for a deprivation of liberty under 
the Fourteenth Amendment.
68
 In that case, Baker’s brother used Baker’s 
personal information when the police booked him for an arrest based on 
narcotics charges.
69
 Several months later, Baker was jailed for eight days 
pursuant to the outstanding warrant on his brother, but which was issued in 
his name.
70
 The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of 
Baker’s claim, admonishing, “The Constitution does not guarantee that 
only the guilty will be arrested.”71 The Court reasoned that “[a]bsent an 
attack on the validity of the warrant under which he was arrested,” the 
respondent’s claim of mistaken identity is insufficient to warrant due 
process protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.
72
 
C. The Split Among the Circuits 
1. The Move Away from Individual Rights 
The federal courts increasingly have found the existence of probable 
 
 
magistrate’s probable cause determination “as a remedial rather than a substantive question has every 
appearance of a cynical maneuver intended to obscure the substitution of current judicial preferences 
in place of the values of the Framers.” Donald Dripps, Living With Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906, 907 
(1986). See also infra Part III. However, the courts do not look at the subjective intent of the officer, 
but instead examine whether the officer’s actions were objectively reasonable. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 
457 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1982).  
 66. Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 804 (1971). 
 67. 443 U.S. 137 (1979). 
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. at 140-41. 
 70. Id. at 141. 
 71. Id. at 145-46. Without any constraints on police discretion, however, the Fourth Amendment 
is meaningless. The purpose of the Bill of Rights is to “identify values that may not be sacrificed to 
[the] expediency” of having effective law enforcement. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 980 
(1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also supra notes 2, 4, 5, 9, & 38, outlining the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment. 
 72. Baker, 443 U.S. at 143-44. A powerful dissent by Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan 
and Marshall, proclaimed the clear unconstitutionality of burdening the wrong man with arrest and 
imprisonment due to inadequate identification procedures. Justice Stevens further noted that such a 
burden was incongruous with the procedures “mandated by the Constitution which serve to minimize 
the risk of wrongful and unjustified deprivations of personal liberty.” Id. at 153-54 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). In addition, Justice Stevens also weighed the societal interests in protecting the innocent 
equally with the interests of apprehending the guilty. Id. at 156. The majority, however, concluded just 
the opposite, based upon the concern that every case of misidentification, when police had a valid 
warrant or probable cause, would constitute a deprivation of liberty. Id. at 146 n.5. 
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cause for an arrest warrant, even in circumstances where the police arrest 
the wrong person.
73
 In a case involving an attorney who mistakenly 
submitted the wrong, though similar, name to the grand jury for an 
indictment, a federal court was unwilling to sustain an individual’s claim 
of constitutional injury.
74
 In Herrera v. Millsap,
75
 the district attorney’s 
office erroneously submitted the name Gerardo Herrera to the grand jury 
for an indictment for a hotel theft, instead of the name Gerald Herrera.
76
 
Consequently, a warrant was issued for Gerardo Herrera.
77
 Pursuant to the 
warrant, police arrested and imprisoned Gerardo Herrera for several 
days.
78
 After the police discovered the mistake and dropped the case, 
Gerardo Herrera brought a deprivation of liberty claim under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983.
79
 The district court found that because the indictment and arrest 
warrant were valid, Herrera suffered no constitutional injury.
80
 Relying on 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Baker v. McCollan,81 the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that an arrest pursuant to a facially valid 
warrant which results in that person’s confinement does not violate that 
person’s constitutional rights even though that person was not actually 
“wanted” for the investigated crime.82 Herrera, however, attempted to 
distinguish Baker by arguing that his cause of action was based upon the 
prearrest actions taken by the police.
83
 The court dismissed any possible 
argument of lack of probable cause by characterizing the pre-arrest actions 
 
 
 73. Professor Dripps reasons that in the context of evaluating the validity of probable cause for 
search warrants, courts eschew this constitutional quagmire by deferring to an officer’s reasonable 
objectivity in relying on a magistrate’s determination of probable cause. Dripps, supra note 65, at 940. 
The practical effect is the merging of the existence of probable cause with the issue of an officer’s 
good faith “into a single inquiry about the sufficiency of the warrant.” Id. at 941. Such deference to the 
objective good faith of the police officer executing a warrant “is at odds with the central purpose of the 
Fourth Amendment, which is distrust of discretionary police powers.” Maclin, Central Meaning, supra 
note 2, at 248. 
 74. See Herrera v. Millsap, 862 F.2d 1157, 1158 (5th Cir. 1989). 
 75. Id.  
 76. Id. Although the police officer investigating the theft was informed that “Gerald Herrera” 
committed the crime, the police records and indictment charged “Gerardo Herrera” instead. Id. 
 77. Id. at 1158-59. 
 78. Id. at 1159.  
 79. Id. See text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, supra note 19, for a plaintiff’s cause of action under “color 
of law.” 
 80. Herrera, 862 F.2d at 1158. 
 81. 443 U.S. 137 (1979). 
 82. Herrera, 862 F.2d at 1160 (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 142-45 (1979)). 
 83. Id. at 1160. Although the decision does not detail this line of reasoning by the plaintiff, this 
argument seems to foreshadow possible doubt as to the validity of the warrant based on the erroneous 
indictment. The court failed to address the issue of probable cause, perhaps indicating that the plaintiff 
did not preserve this issue for appeal in the record below. 
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as mere negligence, at best, which is not actionable under § 1983.
84
 
Similarly, courts have been willing to find the existence of probable 
cause, even when an outstanding warrant is improperly left in the active 
files. In United States v. Towne,
85
 a Vermont State Police Sergeant 
arrested Edwin Towne pursuant to an outstanding warrant from New 
Hampshire
86
 that was improperly kept in the active files.
87
 A search of 
Towne’s car incident to his arrest uncovered firearms.88 A magistrate 
issued a search warrant for Towne’s residence based on both an affidavit 
by an agent from the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms and 
Towne’s arrest.89 The search of Towne’s residence uncovered several 
other firearms, which Towne possessed in violation of federal law, 
resulting in an eight-count federal indictment.
90
 On appeal from his 
criminal conviction, Towne argued that the arresting officer in Vermont 
lacked probable cause to arrest him because the New Hampshire charges 
had been withdrawn, and thus his arrest violated the Fourth Amendment.
91
 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held, however, that the 
arresting officer’s reliance on the outstanding warrant was reasonable, 
 
 
 84. Id. 
 85. 870 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 86. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4954 (1998) (authorizing warrantless arrests of fugitives from 
other states). 
 87. Towne, 870 F.2d at 882. Edwin Towne, Jr. allegedly assaulted a young girl in New 
Hampshire in 1979. Id. at 882. A grand jury returned an indictment in 1980. Id.  Law enforcement 
personnel issued a warrant for Towne’s arrest when he failed to appear in court for his arraignment on 
the aggravated, felonious assault charge. Id. Before the time of the indictment in New Hampshire, 
Vermont police had apprehended, indicted, convicted, and sentenced Towne on kidnapping and sexual 
assault charges. Id. Following the appeal, which reversed Towne’s conviction and ordered him a new 
trial, he entered into a plea agreement with the Vermont State’s Attorney. Id. During the plea 
negotiations, the Vermont State’s Attorney was in contact with the New Hampshire authorities who 
had agreed to drop the pending New Hampshire charges against Towne. Id. However, New Hampshire 
never removed the indictment against Towne from its active status, and the fugitive warrant was never 
withdrawn. Id. Two years after Towne’s release from prison in 1986, he became a suspect in the case 
of a missing teenage girl in Vermont. Id. A background check from the National Computer 
Information Center (NCIC) revealed the outstanding fugitive warrant for Towne from New 
Hampshire. Id. Police subsequently arrested Towne pursuant to that warrant. Id. 
 88. Id. at 882-83. 
 89. Id. at 883. A magistrate issued the search warrant one month after Towne’s arrest by the 
Vermont State Police. Id. 
 90. 870 F.2d at 883. 
 91. Id. at 884. Towne contended that the arresting officer knew or should have known that the 
New Hampshire charges had been resolved because the officer was so informed by both Towne’s case 
agent and his parole officer at the correctional facility where he served out his time pursuant to the 
Vermont plea agreement. Id. However, after Towne was apprehended on the fugitive charge, he was 
arraigned, and the court found probable cause for the arrest. Id. at 883. The court held that the arresting 
officer was entitled to arrest Towne based on a Vermont statute that permits a warrantless arrest of a 
criminal fugitive from another state. Id. at 882 (citing VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4954). Towne pleaded 
not guilty at his arraignment. Id. at 883. 
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given the circumstances, and that there was probable cause. Thus, there 
was no Fourth Amendment violation.
92
 
Alternatively, courts may assume the existence of probable cause and 
analyze a constitutional deprivation of liberty claim for wrongful arrest 
and imprisonment using a postwarrant reasonableness analysis. One such 
case is Johnson v. Miller.
93
 In Johnson, a woman used Johnson’s name 
and savings account to defraud a bank.
94
 The bank caught the perpetrator 
but mistakenly gave the police Johnson’s name and address when filing 
the criminal complaint.
95
 The warrant that was subsequently issued listed 
Johnson’s name and address, but gave a physical description of the real 
perpetrator.
96
 After police arrested Johnson, she informed the judge at the 
preliminary hearing of the mistake. The judge then “entered an order 
stating, ‘wrong defendant warrant to reissue.’”97 The only change to the 
new warrant, however, was that it listed Johnson’s correct birth date; it did 
not remove her name and address.
98
 Because of this error, Johnson was 
wrongfully arrested a second time.
99
 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit dismissed Johnson’s § 1983 claim against the arresting officers.100 
The court first relied on dictum in Baker
101
 to suggest that a facially valid 
warrant does not violate the Fourth Amendment.
102
 Next, examining the 
 
 
 92. Id. at 884. The court based its finding of reasonableness under the circumstances on the fact 
that the arresting officer called the New Hampshire authorities prior to arresting Towne, and they 
confirmed that the warrant for Towne was still “active.” Id.  
 In effect, the court analyzed probable cause for Towne’s arrest in terms of reasonableness. See 
also Gray v. Cuyahoga County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 150 F.3d 579, 582-83 (6th Cir. 1998) (applying a 
standard of reasonableness when evaluating the constitutionality of an arrest made pursuant to a 
facially valid warrant). However, Professor Davies’s Framing-Era research suggests that analyzing the 
lawfulness of an arrest in terms of reasonableness is a product of modern advocacy of aggressive law 
and order and has no historical basis. Davies, supra note 2, at 559-60, 591-601. The confusion blurring 
the line between the probable cause and the reasonableness analyses is manifest in the federal courts. 
See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 94 F.3d 1465, 1467-68 (10th Cir. 1996) (“[A]rrests [are] the most 
intrusive of Fourth Amendment seizures and reasonable only if supported by probable cause.”) 
(emphasis added).  
 93. 680 F.2d 39 (7th Cir. 1982). 
 94. Id. at 40. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. Johnson was a Caucasian female, born May 2, 1951, and five feet and five inches tall. Id. 
However, the warrant described the suspect in the bank fraud as a black female, born February 5, 
1951, and five feet and seven inches tall. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 42. 
 101. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 143-44 (1979). 
 102. Johnson v. Miller, 680 F.2d 39, 41 (7th Cir. 1982) (“If an arrest warrant is valid on its face, 
its execution against the person named in the warrant does not violate the Fourth Amendment even if, 
because someone has made a mistake, the person named in the warrant is not the person whom the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss4/6
   
 
 
 
 
 
2001] CONSTITUTIONAL AMNESIA 1243 
 
 
 
 
reasonableness of the arresting officer’s actions, the court determined that 
an arresting officer cannot “be said to have acted wrongfully merely 
because the warrant he executed contained a description that did not match 
the appearance of Miss Johnson.”103 Finally, as to the second arrest, the 
court assumed that even if the arresting officer knew the warrant was 
mistakenly issued and was negligent in executing it, there was still no 
Fourth Amendment violation.
104
 
These three cases represent modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: 
the willingness to excuse arguably excessive law enforcement powers in 
the interest of combating crime. 
D. The Preservation of Individual Rights 
In contrast to the trend in the case law upholding probable cause in 
cases of mistaken arrest and deprivation of constitutional rights, the Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently held that a facially valid but 
erroneously issued warrant cannot constitute probable cause for an 
arrest.
105
 In Berg v. County of Allegheny,
106
 a clerk generated a warrant for 
Berg when she mistakenly transposed the digits of the criminal complaint 
number for the person whose arrest the police actually sought.
107
 Despite 
Berg’s protestations and offer to show the arresting constable108 his 
official “release documents” which signified that he was no longer on 
parole,
109
 he was arrested and jailed for five days.
110
 Berg brought a suit 
 
 
authorities intended to arrest.”) (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 143-44 (1989)). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See Berg v. County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 269-71 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 106. 219 F.3d 261. 
 107. Id. at 266. The events leading up to the erroneously-issued warrant deserve some attention. 
The supervisor of the county’s probation services had requested an arrest warrant for Paul Banks for 
violating his parole. Id. A judge approved the warrant, pursuant to the requirements for probable cause 
and sent an Arrest Warrant Information Sheet to the warrant clerk responsible for the clearance and 
issuance of all arrest warrants in the county. Id. When entering Paul Banks’s criminal complaint 
number into the computerized system, the clerk mistakenly transposed two numbers and retrieved 
Raymond Berg’s file instead. Id. Berg was in the system because of a drunk driving charge three years 
earlier. Id. at 266-67. The clerk failed to notice that all of the information (name, date of birth, criminal 
complaint number, Social Security number, and address) retrieved by her entry was different from that 
on the Warrant Sheet. Id. at 267. The clerk did notice that the address was different and changed it in 
Berg’s file to comport with what she thought was the most recent information on the Warrant Sheet. 
Id. She then generated an arrest warrant for Raymond Berg. Id. 
 108. The constable was elected by the county, authorized to make arrests, and earned a fee for 
each person arrested. Id. at 267. 
 109. If Berg was no longer on parole, it is implausible that law enforcement could arrest him for a 
parole violation. 
 110. Id. at 268. The arresting constable actually called the County Sheriff’s Office, confirming 
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against the county, his probation supervisor, the warrant clerk, and the 
arresting constable, alleging civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. §§ 
1983,
111
 1985(3),
112
 1988,
113
 and the Fourth,
114
 Fifth,
115
 and Fourteenth
116
 
Amendments.
117
 The district court, finding that Berg’s arrest was 
constitutional because it was based on a facially valid warrant, granted 
summary judgment for the defendants and dismissed the case.
118
 The Third 
Circuit, relying in part on Whiteley v. Warden,
119
 reversed the district 
court’s determination of probable cause.120 The Third Circuit reasoned that 
the government officials that issued the warrant did not have probable 
cause for an arrest warrant for Berg independent of the probable cause for 
the arrest of Paul Banks.
121
 The Berg Court, distinguishing Berg’s case 
from Baker v. McCollan,
122
 framed the Fourth Amendment issue in terms 
of the preissuance requirement of probable cause for an arrest warrant.
123
 
The Baker Court, on the other hand, couched the Fourth Amendment 
question in terms of postissuance reasonableness.
124
 The Third Circuit also 
held that the Fourth Amendment was applicable, even though the 
erroneous warrant was the result of a clerical error.
125
 The court reasoned 
 
 
that Berg’s warrant was still “active.” Id. Berg’s arrest took place on December 30, 1994. Id. at 267. 
Probation Services and the courts were closed due to the holidays, which resulted in Berg’s nearly 
weeklong imprisonment. Id. at 268. Law enforcement officials did not clear up the mistake and release 
Berg until Berg’s attorney intervened. Id. 
 111. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) (civil action for deprivation of liberty under official color of right). 
 112. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1994) (conspiracy to interfere with civil rights; to deny equal protection 
of the laws). 
 113. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994) (proceedings in vindication of civil rights; attorney’s fees). 
 114. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (unconstitutional seizure for lack of probable cause for arrest). 
 115. U.S. CONST. amend. V (deprivation of liberty without due process of law). 
 116. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (deprivation of liberty without due process of law). 
 117. Berg v. County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 268 (3d Cir. 2000). Berg originally filed the 
lawsuit in state court. Id. The defendants removed the case to the District Court for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. 401 U.S. 560 (1971). See supra note 48-56 and accompanying test discussing Whiteley. 
 120. Berg, 219 F.3d at 271. The Berg Court also cited several state court cases to support its 
reliance on Whiteley, 401 U.S. 560, and what is now known as the “collective knowledge” rule. Id. at 
270 n.4 (citing state cases). Courts use the collective knowledge rule to “impute” the knowledge of one 
officer onto another. See United States v. Meade, 110 F.3d 190, 193-94 & n.2 (1st Cir. 1997) (“[W]hen 
a law enforcement officer with information amounting to probable cause directs an officer, who lacks 
the knowledge to make the arrest, we ‘impute’ to the arresting officer the directing officer’s 
knowledge.”). When the directing officer lacks probable cause to order the arrest, the arrest itself is 
unlawful even though the arresting officer properly relied on the direction of the commanding officer. 
Id. at 194 n.2 (citing Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 568 (1971)).  
 121. 219 F.3d at 271.  
 122. 443 U.S. 137 (1979). 
 123. Berg, 219 F.3d at 271 n.6. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 271. But cf. Wise v. City of Philadelphia, No. CIV.A.97-2651, 1998 WL 464918, at *2 
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that “[b]ecause the courts are the arm of the government charged with 
issuing warrants, [the probable cause] requirement is directed to court 
officials as well as law enforcement officers.”126 
III. FACIALLY VALID, THOUGH LATENTLY DEFECTIVE WARRANTS AS 
CONSTITUTING PROBABLE CAUSE 
A. Why a Latent Defect in a Warrant Should Not Constitute Probable 
Cause for the Subsequent Arrest of the Wrong Person 
As previously noted, the arrest of a completely innocent person is a 
fairly common occurrence.
127
 The Fourth Amendment is chipped away 
each time a person that is arrested is not the person named in the 
warrant
128
 or the warrant itself incorrectly identifies a person different 
from the individual whom the police intend to arrest.
129
 In the absence of 
exigent circumstances that would justify a warrantless arrest,
130
 the Fourth 
Amendment Reasonableness Clause should not be used to shield law 
enforcement from liability for wrongful arrests where probable cause was 
 
 
(E.D. Pa. July 31, 1998) (citing Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 15-16) (“Defendants cannot be held 
liable under § 1983 where they rely on a computerized record or a warrant which is inaccurate because 
of a clerical error.”); Fullard v. City of Philadelphia, No. CIV.A.95-4949, 1996 WL 195388, at *9-14 
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 1996) (holding no § 1983 liability for a search when, because of a clerical error, the 
plaintiff’s address, rather than that of the subject of the warrant, was erroneously specified in a valid 
arrest warrant). 
 126. Berg, 219 F.3d at 271. See also Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 13-15 (downplaying the 
significance that the unlawful arrest was the result of the mistake of a court clerk and not a police 
officer). 
 127. See supra notes 11-18, 40. See also Faye A. Silas, A Bad Rap: Snafus in Computer Warrants, 
71 A.B.A. J. 24 (1985) (class action filed on behalf of an estimated 2000 people misidentified and 
wrongly arrested each year on erroneous warrants in Los Angeles County); Appellate Summaries, 
Criminal Law & Procedure-Mistaken Identity, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Feb. 11, 2000, at 1, available at 
WL, Westnews, Chidlb (reporting appellate decision upholding mistaken arrest of an individual 
because probable cause existed for the person the actual person intended); Grace Murphy, Mistaken 
Arrests Spur Reviews: Maine’s Courts Begin a Systemwide Check of Outstanding Arrest Warrants and 
Will Cross-Check with the Sheriff’s Departments, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, May 19, 2000, at 6B, 
available at 2000 WL 5082676 (reporting that two people were mistakenly arrested within the same 
week); Simpson, supra note 40, at A4 (warrant issued to the wrong man who had the same name as the 
person actually intended); Ed White, City, Officers Added to Mistaken-Identity Suit Emily Bassett, 
Who Is Suing Kent and Mecosta Counties for Arresting Her Without Proper ID Checks, Blames City 
Officers for Taking Her to Jail, THE GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Aug. 19, 2000, at A3, available at 2000 
WL 25161379 (woman arrested and held overnight on a warrant for another woman after telling at 
least three judges that she was not the woman police were seeking).  
 128. See, e.g., Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797 (1971); West v. Cabell, 153 U.S. 78 (1894). 
 129. See, e.g., Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979); Herrera v. Millsap, 862 F.2d 1157 (5th 
Cir. 1989). 
 130. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
   
 
 
 
 
 
1246 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 79:1227 
 
 
 
 
lacking for a particular person when the warrant was issued.
131
 No 
probable cause actually exists for an individual mistakenly arrested or 
taken into custody by the police if the police did not truly intend to arrest 
that particular person.
132
 When courts validate the existence of probable 
cause in these circumstances, they implicitly impute probable cause to 
arrest an innocent person from the arresting officer’s good-faith belief that 
he was arresting the correct person.
133
 Likewise, probable cause is imputed 
to the innocent person when the arresting officer relies, in good faith, on a 
magistrate’s determination of probable cause.134 This imputation is 
disconcerting because it seems to legitimize careless or grossly negligent 
law enforcement behavior.
135
 Equally problematic is finding the existence 
of probable cause when law enforcement officials or the courts later 
discover that the contents of a warrant or the issuance of a warrant was in 
error.
136
 Some courts have eschewed this problem by shifting their 
analyses away from probable cause and towards whether the arrest was 
“reasonable” given the circumstances.137  Yet, it is idiosyncratic to justify 
a Fourth Amendment violation based on the “reasonableness” of the arrest 
when, by definition, a violation is itself unreasonable.
138
 As courts 
continue to maintain that latently defective warrants are nonetheless 
supportable by probable cause, the effective functioning of law 
 
 
 131. The presumption that it is “reasonable to rely on a defective warrant is the product of 
constitutional amnesia.” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 972 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 132. But see discussion of probable cause as it relates to an arresting officer’s intent, supra note 
65. 
 133. See, e.g., Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 804 (1971); United States v. Meade, 110 F.3d 190, 
193-94 (1st Cir. 1997). 
 134. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984) (“[T]he officers’ reliance on the 
magistrate’s determination of probable cause was objectively reasonable . . . .”). But see Beck v. Ohio, 
379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964) (“‘[G]ood faith on the part of the arresting officers is not enough’. . . . If 
subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, 
and the people would be ‘secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,’ only in the discretion of 
the police.”) (quoting Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959)). 
 135. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 40 (disbelieving Jay Nugent’s death, though his belongings 
were found below an avalanche eight years earlier, police arrested Jay’s brother, Ray, believing that he 
was Jay). 
 136. See, e.g., Krohn v. United States, 742 F.2d 24, 26-27 (1st Cir. 1984) (conceding that the 
affidavit for the issuance of the warrant was invalid, but holding that a “federal official does not 
violate the Constitution by executing a facially valid state warrant, if he does not know that it is 
invalid.”); Johnson v. Miller, 680 F.2d 39, 41 (7th Cir. 1982) (refuting any claim of a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment even if the arresting officer had reason to know the warrant was mistakenly issued 
and was negligent in executing it). 
 137. For a criticism of the reasonableness approach, see Maclin, Central Meaning, supra note 2, at 
210-214 (arguing that “[s]uch a formula lacks content, and amounts to nothing more than an ad hoc 
judgment about the desirability of certain police intrusions.”). See also Part III.B. and supra notes 92, 
134. 
 138. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 970 & n.23 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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enforcement rises at the cost of eroding individual liberties that the 
Framers safeguarded in the Fourth Amendment.
139
 
B. The Current Confusion of Federal Case Law 
The development of case law in this area—constitutional claims of 
deprivation of liberty resulting from an erroneous arrest—has vacillated 
because plaintiffs have utilized different legal theories to support their 
claims, under either the Fourth Amendment or the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
140
 Moreover, courts freely reconcile potentially inconsistent 
results by simply distinguishing the facts of each case.
141
 Finally, many 
courts have shifted the analysis of these wrongful arrest claims away from 
preissuance of an arrest warrant to a postissuance of the arrest warrant 
reasonableness approach.
142
  
The question of under which legal theory a wrongful arrest claim 
should be argued should no longer be a source of confusion because 
federal courts now require such claims to be brought as wrongful seizure 
claims in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
143
 The Supreme Court no 
doubt approves of this determination because fifteen years earlier in Baker 
 
 
 139. In the context of a search warrant, Professor Dripps goes one step further, arguing that Leon 
stands for the proposition that “a search unsupported by probable cause but pursuant to a facially valid 
warrant is now legal.” Dripps, supra note 65, at 934-35. Therefore, the police impliedly have a “duty 
to execute the illegal warrant.” Id. at 935. For a discussion of the original meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment and the Framers’ intent, see Davies, supra notes 2, 4, 5, 9, 38, 92.  
 140. Before the Supreme Court in Graham v. Connor pronounced that the Fourth Amendment 
governs constitutional challenges to arrests, individuals often brought their claims as deprivations of 
liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 
137 (1979); Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971); Brown v. Byer, 870 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1989); 
Simons v. Clemons, 752 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1985); Johnson v. Miller, 680 F.2d 39 (7th Cir. 1982); 
Powe v. City of Chicago, 664 F.2d 639 (7th Cir. 1981). 
 141. See, e.g., Brown, 870 F.2d at 978 (distinguishing Baker as a case of mistaken identity, which 
cannot be dispositive of Brown’s complaint that the arresting officer intentionally altered the warrant 
to match her description); Johnson, 680 F.2d at 41 (distinguishing Johnson’s case from Baker, based 
on the differences between Johnson’s appearance and the physical description in the warrant). 
 142. In this context, courts do not question the validity of the warrant or probable cause, but 
instead, examine the arresting officer’s reasonable belief that the warrant was valid for the intended 
arrestee. See Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1971) (finding that because the police had 
probable cause to arrest Hill, the mistaken arrest of Miller based on the officers’ reasonable belief that 
he was Hill did not violate the Fourth Amendment); Wise v. City of Philadelphia, No. CIV.A.97-2651, 
1998 WL 464918, at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 31, 1998) (finding that the arresting officers reasonably relied 
on an invalid bench warrant); St. Fort v. Grinnel, No. 95-C-2295, 1995 WL 632274, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 
Oct. 26, 1995) (“An officer acting upon a facially valid warrant possesses probable cause to arrest.”). 
But see Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 20 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (questioning the Court’s 
proposition in Leon that “courts should not look behind the face of a warrant on which police have 
relied on in good faith.”). 
 143. See Blackwell v. Barton, 34 F.3d 298, 302 (5th Cir. 1994) (relying on Graham v. Connor, 
490 U.S. 386 (1989)). 
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v. McCollan,
144
 the Court forecasted its preference for using the Fourth 
Amendment to dismiss a plaintiff’s claim brought under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
145
 The Court gave significant weight to the fact that Baker 
did not attack the validity of the arrest warrant.
146
 Consequently, the Court 
left unanswered the possibility of a successful challenge of the arrest on 
Fourth Amendment grounds, had Baker challenged the validity of the 
warrant itself.
147
 
Whiteley v. Warden,
148
 which preceded Baker,
149
 was actually the 
Supreme Court’s first foray into invalidating an arrest on constitutional 
grounds under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments in which probable 
cause was subsequently found to be deficient.
150
 Other courts have 
subsequently relied on the Court’s pronouncement in Whiteley151 for 
analyzing similar issues.
152
 The distinguishing feature in Whiteley, 
however, is that the arresting officers did not make the arrest pursuant to a 
warrant.
153
 Instead, the arrest was based on a police bulletin, which law 
enforcement personal assumed was based on a valid arrest warrant.
154
 This 
is the sort of factual difference that allows the federal courts to 
subjectively select their reliance on either Whiteley or Baker to support 
their decisions, either by distinguishing those cases in order to justify their 
own holdings
155
 or by simply refusing to rely on them at all.
156
 Hence, the 
muddled case law is the result of the subtle nuances created by 
 
 
 144. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144-45 (1979).  
 145. Id. at 144-45.  
 146. Id. at 143-44. See quote infra Part I.B. 
 147. But cf. Baker, 443 U.S. at 150 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the absence of 
procedures for ensuring “a person being detained for the alleged commission of a crime was in fact the 
person believed to be guilty of the offense” violates the respondent’s liberty under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 148. 401 U.S. 560 (1971). 
 149. 443 U.S. 137. 
 150. 401 U.S. at 568-69. 
 151. 401 U.S. 560 (1971). 
 152. See, e.g., Berg v. County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 269-79 (3d Cir. 2000); United States v. 
Meade, 110 F.3d 190, 194 & n.2 (1st Cir. 1997); Ruehman v. Sheahan, 34 F.3d 525, 527 (7th Cir. 
1994). 
 153. Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 563 (1971). 
 154. 401 U.S. at 563-64.  
 155. See Wells & Eaton, supra note 19, at 257 (arguing that the Court in Baker distorted the facts 
to make the case easier). 
 156. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Swyden, 139 F.3d 464, 468-69 (5th Cir. 1998) (relying on Baker v. 
McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979), to dismiss Sanchez’s § 1983 claim against law enforcement agents for 
deprivation of liberty); United States v. Meade, 110 F.3d 190, 194 (1st Cir. 1997) (finding it 
unnecessary to rely on Whiteley in order to impute knowledge of probable cause to the arresting officer 
because “both the directing officer and the arresting officer individually possessed the requisite 
knowledge”); Herrera v. Millsap, 862 F.2d 1157, 1160 (5th Cir. 1989) (dodging Herrera’s attempt to 
distinguish his case from Baker by relying on cases within its own jurisdiction). 
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differentiating the facts
157
 of each case and the issue of which 
constitutional provision is the basis for the claim.
158
 
The most problematic factor that perpetuates the disjointed case law is 
the shift in analysis away from the preissuance of an arrest warrant to a 
postwarrant inquiry into the reasonableness of the arrest. This change 
implicates an analysis under the Search and Seizure Clause rather than the 
Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment.
159
 The Third Circuit 
recognized this shift in analysis in its attempt to reconcile its decision in 
Berg with the divergent outcomes of other circuits:  
Unlike [Baker], Berg challenges the generation and execution of the 
warrant for his arrest, not the decision to incarcerate him after 
arrest. At issue here is not whether authorities must investigate the 
claims of innocence of a person who has been legally arrested but 
what precautions the Constitution requires before an arrest warrant 
is issued and executed.
160
 
This shift in analysis from probable cause for the arrest warrant to 
reasonableness of the actual arrest distorts the original intent of the Fourth 
Amendment and reflects a modern expansion of police power.
161
 The 
proper concern of the Fourth Amendment, as the Framers intended, is the 
“right to be secure” and not the “question-evading platitudes about 
‘reasonableness.’”162  
 
 
 157. This Note suggests that instead of attempting to differentiate facts in order to justify disparate 
outcomes in probable cause or reasonableness determinations, courts should simply analogize the facts 
and legal arguments before them. See supra note 57. See also Part IV. 
 158. The difference between a constitutional challenge for wrongful arrest and imprisonment 
brought under the Fourth Amendment versus the Fourteenth Amendment is subtle. Both call into 
question the legality of the arrest, regardless of whether it is analyzed as a wrongful “seizure” under 
the Fourth Amendment or as a deprivation of liberty claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. It is not 
unlike the difference of a wrongful arrest claim analyzed in terms of prearrest probable cause 
requirements versus a postarrest analysis in terms of reasonableness. See supra note 92 and 
accompanying test. However, in order for a plaintiff to prevail on a § 1983 action for wrongful arrest, 
courts have moved in the direction of requiring that the arrest be challenged as an unlawful seizure in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Davis, 94 F.3d 1465 (10th Cir. 1996); 
Blackwell v. Barton, 34 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 1994).  
 159. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”). 
 160. Berg v. County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 271 n.6 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Murray v. City of 
Chicago, 634 F.2d 365, 367 (7th Cir. 1980) (distinguishing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979) 
on the same ground)). 
 161. See Davies, supra note 2, at 749-50.  
 162. Id. at 750. 
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C. The Great Compromise: Bargaining Away the Fourth Amendment and 
its Effects on Individual Rights 
The prearrest constitutional requirement of probable cause is not an 
inconsequential one. However, the need for effective law enforcement is 
an equally desirable goal. Unfortunately, the current balance struck 
between these competing goals in favor of law enforcement adversely 
affects an individual’s rights to redress his government.163 There are 
already several obstacles, such as the various immunity doctrines,
164
 that 
encumber an individual’s ability to seek redress from the federal 
government under § 1983 for a constitutional tort violation. However, the 
first hurdle to overcome is the determination of probable cause under the 
Fourth Amendment.
165
 A judicial finding of probable cause forecloses all 
other inquiry into the constitutionality of the arrest. This foreclosure has 
the greatest impact when a court validates a latently defective warrant. 
Such a finding of probable cause, in spite of a technical defect in the 
warrant, condones erroneous law enforcement work by permitting 
wrongful arrests and imprisonments to go undeterred. Therefore, an 
individual arrested and imprisoned pursuant to a defective warrant has no 
means by which to remedy the social stigma of humiliation and public 
embarrassment, economic loss from missed employment, or any other 
harm
166
 that may result from arrest and imprisonment.   
IV. PROPOSAL FOR RESTORING THE INTEGRITY OF THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT 
The increasing deference to law enforcement exhibited by the federal 
courts in their review of probable cause for arrest warrants threatens the 
protection of individual liberties that the Framers guaranteed in the Fourth 
Amendment and therefore must be halted. The solution calls for a more 
stringent analysis of probable cause by the federal courts. Although there 
is a long history of evolved case law on the standard for probable cause, it 
 
 
 163. The right to seek redress from one’s government for grievances is found in the First 
Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. I. (“[T]he right of the people . . . to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances.”). The ability to sue the government for deprivation of liberty or due process is 
statutorily granted by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See supra note 19 for the text of § 1983. 
 164. For an explanation of these immunities and how they can affect one’s ability to sue the 
government, see supra note 22. 
 165. The existence of probable cause to arrest constitutes justification and “is a complete defense 
to an action for false arrest.” Bernard v. United States, 25 F.3d 98, 102 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 166. Surell Brady, Arrests Without Prosecution and the Fourth Amendment, 59 MD. L. REV. 1, 60-
63 (2000) (outlining individual harms that attach when a person is arrested). 
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is very easy for courts to lapse into evaluating an arrest in terms of 
reasonableness under the Search and Seizure Clause. Although the 
reasonableness analysis may be preferable in other contexts, such as 
evaluating a search and seizure for the purpose of suppressing evidence in 
a criminal prosecution, it is not justified in cases of wrongful arrest of an 
innocent person based on a latently defective warrant. In the former 
scenario of the exclusionary rule, a person has been charged with a crime 
and is entrenched in a criminal prosecution. In the latter scenario, the 
police discover that they have arrested the wrong (and innocent) person 
whom they neither intended to arrest nor could they charge with a crime. 
Although it is true that a person properly suspected by law enforcement 
may turn out to be innocent, the sanctity of individual liberties requires a 
more stringent standard of protection at the outset of the arrest. The tough-
on-crime policy fueling aggressive law enforcement is not of absolute 
primacy here.  
Moreover, a warrant that is valid on its face, but which is later 
determined to have a latent defect due to some erroneous information, 
cannot logically be valid. The Third Circuit astutely recognized this as 
circular reasoning when it overruled the district court’s finding of probable 
cause based on a facially valid warrant in Berg.
167
 This plain logic 
approach simply means that irrespective of whether a technical defect in a 
warrant is the result of a clerical error or law enforcement agent’s error,168 
that warrant cannot supply probable cause for an arrest when the police 
subsequently arrest the wrong person in reliance on that warrant.
169
 
Although the warrant, on its face, gives no indication of its defect, there is 
no legal basis for probable cause for the issuance of the warrant.
170
  
A judicial determination of the constitutional validity of an arrest under 
a literal reading of the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment should 
 
 
 167. 219 F.3d 261 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 168. Id. (“Because the courts are the arm of government charged with issuing warrants, we believe 
this requirement is directed to court officials as well as law enforcement officers.”). But cf. Arizona v. 
Evans, 514 U.S. at 14-16 (refusing to apply the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence obtained by 
police executing a warrant later deemed invalid due to erroneous computer information by a court 
clerk). 
 169. 219 F.3d at 270-71 (“[T]he legality of a seizure . . . depends on whether the officer[] . . . 
possessed the requisite basis to seize the [particular] suspect.”) (quoting Rogers v. Powell, 120 F.3d 
446, 453 (3d Cir. 1997)). 
 170. In fact, the probable cause for the person actually intended for arrest was a parole violation. 
Id. at 266. The person named in the warrant had satisfied his parole three years earlier. Id. at 266-67. 
Therefore, it was legally impossible to issue a warrant to Berg on those grounds. See 40 AM. JUR. 
PROOF OF FACTS 3D Government Liability § 4 (1997) (“[A]n arrest, search, or seizure may be invalid 
where the information received and relied upon by an officer was erroneous to begin with, or was 
miscommunicated to or misinterpreted by the receiving officer.”). 
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cure the potential danger inherent in applying a lesser standard of 
reasonableness. A court’s finding that no probable cause exists when there 
is any latent defect in the warrant will serve three important purposes. 
First, it will preserve the integrity of the Fourth Amendment. Second, it 
will promote accountability and responsibility in executing law 
enforcement and clerical functions.
171
 Third, it removes the initial 
barrier
172
 to an individual’s ability to seek redress from the government. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The current state of federal case law dealing with latently defective 
arrest warrants continues to strip away the individual protections that 
underlie the Fourth Amendment. A proper balance must be struck between 
the Fourth Amendment protection of liberties and effective law 
enforcement. Courts have been too complacent in dismissing individual 
liberties. Preserving the integrity of the Fourth Amendment and respecting 
the Framers’ intent requires a change in the way courts analyze issues of 
probable cause in the context of defective warrants. These ideals can only 
be accomplished by adhering to preissuance constitutional procedures for 
probable cause and resolving such issues in favor of the individual.  
Melanie Schoenfeld

 
 
 171. Without the fear of potential liability under § 1983, police officers would be permitted to 
“run amok . . . so long as they have a piece of paper in their hands called an arrest warrant.” Joye v. 
Richland County, 47 F. Supp. 2d 663, 669-70 (D.S.C. 1999) (quoting Johnson v. Miller, 680 F.2d 39, 
42 (7th Cir. 1982)). 
 172. See supra note 165 regarding probable cause as a barrier to bringing a § 1983 claim. See also 
supra note 22 regarding obstacles to a plaintiff’s ability to seek redress from the government. 
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